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ABSTRACT: As per the conventional wisdom there should be provision for public 
assistance for skill acquirement for achieving higher economic growth in the future. 
However, empirical observations on small OECD countries over the period 2001-2011 tell 
somewhat a different story. This study makes an attempt in explaining those atypical findings, 
first theoretically by means of a simple dynamic two-sector, specific factor general 
equilibrium framework with endogenous skill formation and provision for public subsidy 
on education and then empirically with the help of conventional unbalanced panel data 
models. The analysis questions the desirability of the public subsidy policy on education 
in improving intertemporal social welfare in a small open developed economy.  
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Public Subsidy on Education and Welfare in Small OECD Countries: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Reconciliation 
 
 
1.  Introduction and motivation 
 
Workers in a society are differentiated with respect to their skills. The level of skills 
(say, z ) is a continuous variable and can take any value within the range[0,1] . 
Accordingly, in reality we find different groups of worker e.g. unskilled, low-skilled, 
semi-skilled, and skilled depending on the value of z . The higher the level of skills of a 
worker the greater would be his earning opportunities and hence wage. However, in 
different literatures e.g. the literature on skilled-unskilled wage inequality the distinction 
is simplified and only two extreme types of labor are considered, unskilled (with 0z ≈ ) 
and skilled (with 1z ≈ ).1 Unskilled workers through acquisition of skills can become 
skilled labor over time and skill formation comes through education.2 
 
The aspect of skill formation is extremely crucial in all countries irrespective of whether 
developed or developing.3 It promotes human capital formation through positive 
                                                 
1
 The literature on skilled-unskilled wage inequality includes the works of Harrison and Hanson 
(1999), Curie and Harrison (1997), Robbins (1995), Beyer et al. (1999), Feenstra and Hanson 
(1997), Wood (1997) etc. 
 
2
 In this paper the two words, education and skill formation, have been used interchangeably. 
This means that we presume education automatically leads to higher skills, greater earning 
opportunities and higher wages. No distinction has been made between general education and 
vocational training. 
 
3
 Different facets of skill formation have been discussed in works like Autor (2014), Becker 
(1964), Brown et al. (2001), Crouch et al. (1999), Heckman and Krueger (2003), and Vanhuysse 
(2007).  
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externalities which is conducive to economic growth and prosperity of an economy. The 
literature on standard welfare economics suggests that education should be subsidized 
because it creates positive externalities. The acquisition of skills is a dynamic process. 
Unskilled workers going for skilled formation today would become skilled only 
tomorrow. Hence, given the size of the workforce, skill formation lowers the endowment 
of unskilled labor in the current period while that of skilled labor does not change in the 
current period. National income in the present period must fall as some resources 
(unskilled labor) go out of the production process. In the future unskilled workers going 
for skill acquisition in current period become skilled and therefore, the endowment of 
skilled labor goes up while that of unskilled labor does not change given the size of the 
workforce. Because of increased supply of skilled workers in future national income must 
increase. Hence, the economy clearly gains in future at the cost of present benefits. 
Therefore, the argument for subsidizing education is strengthened only if the subsidy 
improves the intertemporal social welfare. Here welfare is defined as the discounted sum 
of national income of the two periods. 
 
In this context, it is extremely important to present some empirical observations on some 
small OECD countries over the recent periods. From our initial calculations carried out 
on available data for the period 2001-2011, we find that the simple correlation 
coefficients between GDP growth (annual %) and growth in aggregate public spending 
on education (% of GDP) are negative for small OECD economies e.g. Australia (AUS), 
Austria (AUT), Chile (CHL), Czech Republic (CZE), Denmark (DNK), Estonia (EST), 
Greece (GRC), Finland (FIN), Iceland (ISL), Israel (IRL), Netherlands (NLD), Norway 
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(NOR),  Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT), Slovak Republic (SVK),  Slovenia (SVN), Spain 
(ESP), Sweden (SWE), and Switzerland (CHE).4 These are reported in figure 1. It is 
noticed that all these correlation coefficients are negative although they vary widely 
between -0.002 and -0.932. 
 
 
Figure 1: The simple correlation coefficients between economic growth and growth 
in public spending on education as a percentage of GDP of some OECD countries 
 
 
These empirical observations lead to two pertinent questions which are as follows. (i) Do 
these atypical findings suggest that economic growth and public spending on education 
could be negatively related in small developed countries even after controlling all other 
relevant factors for economic growth as well as the great recessionary periods? (ii) If yes, 
could this negative relationship be theoretically explained?  
 
                                                 
4
 The relevant data have been taken out from the World Development Indicators of the World 
Bank (2014).   
 
 5
This paper purports to provide answers to the above questions both theoretically and 
empirically. In the first part of the paper, a simple two-period general equilibrium model 
with endogenous skill formation reasonable for a small open developed economy has 
been developed with an eye to examine the nature of the relationship between 
intertemporal social welfare (economic growth) and public expenditure on education. 
Like any other theoretical model this one is also based on certain simplifying 
assumptions. Quite naturally, the authenticity of the theoretical finding(s) comes into 
question. Keeping this possible criticism in mind the second part of our work is devoted 
to conduct a rigorous econometric analysis of the available data of 21 small OECD 
countries, taking all other prominent growth influencing factors as control variables. Our 
exhaustive consideration of control variables neutralizes the restrictiveness of the 
assumptions of the theoretical model and unravels the direct relationship between 
economic growth and public spending on education. Hence, this part apart from judging 
the appropriateness of the theoretical framework also provides an answer to the first 
question as mentioned above.  
 
We have found an overall statistically significant negative relationship between economic 
growth and growth in public spending on education in the recent period, 2001-2011 
which could be explained by means of our theoretical framework. These findings can at 
least question the desirability of providing public assistance for skill formation from the 
perspective of pure economic growth.  
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2. The Model  
 
 
4. The empirical analysis 
 
This section empirically examines the effect of a change in public spending on education 
(ps_edu) on the economic growth (growth) for those 21 small open OECD countries as 
stated in the introduction section. Here countries are selected in accordance with our 
assumptions of the theoretical model.  
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
 
This paper has developed a dynamic two-sector, specific factor general equilibrium model 
with endogenous skill formation and education subsidy assisting skill acquisition with an eye 
to examine the theoretical plausibility of some recent empirical evidences on small OECD 
countries which suggest that public assistance for skill formation may not lead to higher 
economic growth over time. There are two types of labor, skilled and unskilled, where 
unskilled workers have the opportunity to go for skills acquisition, become skilled, and earn a 
higher wage in future. The aggregate supply of unskilled labor in the economy is determined 
from the intertemporal utility maximizing-behavior of the unskilled working families in the 
current period (period 1). The unskilled workers after acquiring skills join the army of skilled 
labor in future thereby increasing the endowment of skilled labor. Relative commodity prices 
and capital stock remain the same in both periods. Besides, the aggregate size of the 
workforce is also assumed to remain unchanged over time. A public subsidy designed to 
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promote skill formation lowers the supply of unskilled labor in both the periods but raises 
that of skilled labor in future. We have demonstrated that the policy lowers national income 
in the current period while it raises the same in the future. However, what happens to the 
discounted sum of national incomes is ambiguous. Therefore, the policy may fail to deliver 
the goods from the perspective of improving national welfare through assisting skill 
formation.  
 
Our analysis may be criticized on the ground that some important issues like labor market 
imperfection especially those of unskilled labor, unemployment problem, efficiency wage 
considerations, and collective bargaining have not been captured. Furthermore, we do not 
take into account savings and direct costs associated with skill acquisition and its financing 
problem. Hence, the role of capital market imperfection has not been taken care of. The 
absence of any non-traded skill-intensive sector like services is also a limitation of the 
analysis. If some of these features are taken into consideration the results of the model may 
hold subject to one or two additional sufficient conditions. In defense, we can modestly argue 
that these are some of the salient features of the developing countries and that our structure is 
more appropriate for small developed countries rather than developing ones. Our subsequent 
empirical analysis on many small OECD countries also lends a helping hand to believe that 
the relationship between public expenditure on education and economic growth is indeed not 
that much unequivocal as it is believed to be. The present analysis deserves some attention 
because it questions the desirability of public subsidy on education from the standpoint of 
promotion of economic growth through human capital formation.   
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